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Political Gerrymandering and the Courts is a collection of es-
says by sixteen districting experts on the question "What can social 
scientists offer to help courts solve the problem of egregious parti-
san gerrymanders?" The question implies its own subsidiary ques-
tions, such as: 
1) Are there such things as egregious partisan gerrymanders? 
2) If so, how can you tell how egregious they are? 
3) What can courts do about it? 
4) And what can political scientists do about it? 
Since the Supreme Court came closest to considering these 
questions in Davis v. Bandemer,J the book may also be considered a 
series of reflections on the meaning of that case. It is also some-
• This collection consists of the following essays: Bernard Grofman, Unresolved Is-
sues in Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation; Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportion-
ment ReWJlution; Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: 
Bandemer and Thornburg; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and 
Equal Protection; Bruce E. Cain, Perspecti-ves on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Procti-
tioner, Theorist, and Reformer; Charles Backstrom, Leonard Robins, and Scott Eller, Estab-
lishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline; Richard G. Niemi, The Swing Ratio as a 
Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering; Michael D. McDonald and Richard L. Engstrom, De-
tecting Gerrymandering; Gordon E. Baker, The "Totality of Circumstances" Approach; Rich-
ard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspecti-ve; Peter Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political 
Problem Without Judicial Solution; Richard Niemi and John Wilkerson, Compactness and the 
1980s Districts in the Indiana State House: Evidence of Political Gerrymandering?; Richard 
Niemi and Stephen G. Wright, Majority-Win Percentages: An Approach to the Votes-Seats 
Relationship in Light of Davis v. Bandemer; Thomas Hofeller and Bernard Grofman, Com-
poring the Compactness of California Congressional Districts Under Three Different Plans: 
1980, 1982 and 1984; Samuel Kernell and Bernard Grofman, Determining the Predictability 
of Partisan Voting Patterns in California Elections, 1978-1984; Gordon E. Baker, Lessons 
from the 1973 California Masters' Plan. 
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thing of a reunion of contributors to a 1985 UCLA Law Review 
Symposium on gerrymandering. 4 
All the contributors seem to agree that there are such things as 
gerrymanders, electoral districts drawn up to give some people ad-
vantage over others. Almost all seem to agree that some gerryman-
ders are egregious, in the sense of shocking the conscience and 
calling for some kind of remedial action. Thirteen of the contribu-
tors are shocked by egregious partisan gerrymanders, believe courts 
should do something about them, and believe that political scien-
tists can provide courts with standards to single out and curb the 
worst cases. This group, led by the editor, Bernard Grofman, and 
by Gordon Baker (whose pioneering book, Rural Versus Urban 
Political Power,s set the stage for the reapportionment revolution) 
interprets Bandemer as commendably favorable to such 
intervention. 
Two of the three remaining contributors, Daniel Lowenstein 
and Bruce Cain, are shocked by racial but not by partisan gerry-
manders. They deny that political scientists or courts can find satis-
factory standards for identifying partisan gerrymanders, far less 
regulating them-though neither of these dissenters seems to have 
much trouble identifying and regulating racial gerrymanders of the 
wrong sort, and replacing them with benign, "affirmative action" 
racial gerrymanders. Lowenstein, in particular, sees Bandemer as 
commendably closed to intervention against partisan gerrymanders. 
The final dissenter, Peter Schuck, reads Bandemer as favorable 
to intervention, but unduly so because he considers intervention a 
grave error, a cure worse than the disease. He has little to say about 
racial gerrymanders, either in his chapter or in the article from 
which it is extracted.6 But he elsewhere reveals himself as an ad-
mirer of Abigail Themstrom's Whose Votes Count?7 and hence 
must be counted a critic of massive judicial intervention against ra-
cial gerrymanders. s 
In sum, the book is dominated by a large, interventionist ma-
jority on the one hand, confident that they can help courts identify 
and control both partisan and racial gerrymanders, and thinking 
they have a green light from the Supreme Court in Bandemer. A 
4. 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
5. Gordon E. Baker, Rural Venus Urban Political Power (Doubleday, 1955). 
6. Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Reg-
ulation of Politics, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1325, 1326 (1987). 
7. Abigail M. Themstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Vot-
ing Rights (Harv. U. Press, 1987) ("Whose Votes Countr'). 
8. Peter H. Schuck, What Went Wrong With the Voting Rights Act, 19 Washington 
Monthly 51 (Nov. 1987). 
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small trio of dissenters is divided both as to whether Bandemer 
gives a green light against partisan gerrymanders, and as to whether 
it is wise in principle for courts to intervene against racial gerry-
manders. But the dissenters are united in their belief that courts 
should keep hands off partisan gerrymanders. 
In some ways the actual gist of Bandemer is less interesting 
now than it was in 1987 when this book took shape, though 
Grofman was not wrong at the time to call it "potentially the most 
important districting case since Reynolds v. Sims." Bandemer on its 
face could be read to support either the green-light or the red-light 
interpretation. On the one hand, the Court declined to strike down 
a blatant gerrymander, which gave Republicans half again as many 
seats per vote as Democrats in the 1982 elections to the Indiana 
House. On the other hand, a plurality of the Justices declared in 
dictum in favor of the intervention against egregious gerrymander-
ing which would "consistently degrade a voter's ... influence on the 
political process." Surely this dictum could constitute at least a yel-
low light for intervention, especially considering the land-office 
business the courts and the Justice Department were doing at the 
same time in striking down supposed racial gerrymanders and re-
placing them with other racial gerrymanders thought to be more 
favorable to blacks and hispanics.9 
But whatever hint of a green light Bandemer may once have 
flashed must have been extinguished by the Court's refusal to hear 
Badham v. Eu 10 in 1988-after Political Gerrymandering and the 
Courts had been sent to the printer. One may argue whether 
Bandemer, which involved one gerrymandered election in one 
house, was the second most egregious partisan gerrymander of the 
1980's, but there is no doubt which one was first. That distinction 
belongs to the California gerrymanders created in part by Professor 
Cain, 11 attacked by Republicans in Bad ham, and defended in an 
amicus brief by Professor Lowenstein, among others.12 Badham 
9. See, for example, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), decided the same day as 
Bandemer, on evidence supplied by Bernard Grofman. Abigail Thernstrom provides a com-
prehensive survey of the drastic change in the Voting Rights Act's emphasis from enfranchis-
ing Southern blacks to giving blacks and hispanics across the nation a statutory right to 
court-ordered gerrymanders guaranteeing "representation" proportional to their numbers. 
Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? (cited in note 7). 
10. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1983), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 488 U.S. 804 
(1988). 
II. Bruce E. Cain, The Reapponionment Puzzle (U. of California Press, 1984 ). He was 
special consultant to the California Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee in 
1981. 
12. Bernard Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering and the Couns 104 n.3 (Agathon 
Press, 1990) ("Political Gerrymandering"). He was consultant to the Democratic members of 
the House of Representatives in districting litigation throughout the 1980's (id. at xii). 
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involved four or five successive elections and a pro-Democrat, pro-
incumbent gerrymandering so tight that only one district of 135 
changed party hands. District boundaries wandered wildly across 
mountains, deserts, and bays, chopping up cities and counties. 
Some districts were spliced together with narrow strips of beach or 
highway dividers.B For a decade, Democrats had half again as 
many seats per vote in Congress as Republicans. 
The moment the Court decided not to hear Badham, any 
thought of judicial control of gerrymanders under Bandemer evapo-
rated. Bandemer in 1987 was at least a pitcher's scowl at the 
baserunner to threaten a pick-off if he was too far off-base. Ignoring 
the Badham gerrymander was as clear a signal as the Court could 
give (short of saying so) that there will never be any pick-oft's, even 
for the most brazen attempts to steal a base. Savvy coaches like 
Professors Cain and Lowenstein, and the other architects and de-
fenders of the California gerrymander, sensed this years before Bad-
ham, gave the steal sign, and got away with it-just as the chief 
gerrymanderer, the late Congressman Philip Burton (D, Calif.) had 
predicted. "Who will stop us?" he crowed. 
Is this as it should be? The arguments on either side may be 
briefly summarized. In one sense, Gordon Baker is perfectly right: 
the reapportionment revolution was about "achieving fair and effec-
tive representation for all citizens," (Reynolds v. Sims) and debasing 
or diluting people's votes by gerrymandering is hardly less unfair 
than doing it by disfranchisement or malapportionment.'• And 
Grofman, Morill, Niemi, Backstrom, Engstrom, Hofeller, and the 
other districting-expert contributors, are right that dozens of tech-
nical criteria exist to measure compactness, group polarization, 
electoral effects baselines, swing ratios, and so on. There are also 
dozens of technical remedies which a court could order, if so dis-
posed, to limit gerrymandering. Some of these have been used to 
detect and curb racial gerrymanders. Why not put some of them to 
work to curb the most egregious partisan gerrymanders? 
Professors Lowenstein and Cain are less forthright on this 
question in this book than in their earlier works. The 1985 Lowen-
stein rebuttal to the reformers was an assertion that neutral-looking, 
anti-gerrymandering criteria were not neutral in practice; that com-
pactness and contiguity standards, for example, amounted to a 
"Republican Trojan horse," which would pack already-overconcen-
13. See, for example, the illustrations in Ward Elliott, Review of The Reapportionment 
Puzzle, 2 Const. Comm. 203, 206 (1985). 
14. Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, Ch. 2 in Grofman, 
ed., Political Gerrymandering at 11-25 (cited in note 12). 
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trated minority populations into safe but vote-wasting ghettoized 
districts.ls As Gordon Baker notes, this assertion was "not based 
on any concrete evidence" and was refuted by California's actual 
experience with court-ordered, criteria-driven districts in the 
1970's.t6 The 1990 Lowenstein position is that, under his tidied-up 
interpretation of Bandemer, the whole issue has been settled by the 
Supreme Court, obviating the need for further discussion on the 
merits, save for the possibility that a future resurgence of "some 
variant of McCarthyism" might call for protecting "outcast polit-
ical groups" where other constitutional protections were not avail-
able.t7 Surely no major political party could be considered an 
outcast so defined. 
Bruce Cain in 1984 defended his gerrymander on much the 
same grounds as Lowenstein; it was an "affirmative action gerry-
mander" to protect "weak" Democrat client groups, while giving 
extra stability and governing power to the ruling Democratic coali-
tion-which, he argues, should be the sole judge of the wisdom and 
fairness of any apportionment plan.ts I have elsewhere criticized 
this line as transparently partisan,t9 and he does not repeat it in the 
Grofman symposium. His 1990 treatment is more abstract and 
open-ended, with much weighing and balancing of individual and 
group rights, and of symmetrical and asymmetrical ways of treating 
racial and partisan gerrymanders, and less of a preference for letting 
regnant Democratic legislators make all the decisions. He does 
come out for legitimacy, stability, and workability, and against pro-
portional representation (PR) as antithetical to all three. He recom-
mends a " 'subjective' bipartisan" process for redistricting, 
involving input by both parties, and a supermajority rule to give the 
minority party some leverage.2o 
Peter Schuck, the farthest removed of the contributors from 
the California battle lines, is also the most forthright and 
Frankfurterian in opposing intervention on the merits. "A court," 
he argues, "cannot determine whether and to what extent a district-
ing plan 'will consistently degrade a ... group of voters' influence 
15. Daniel Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in 
the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory? 33 UCLA L. Rev. I, 27, 34 (1985). 
16. Gordon F. Baker, Lessons from the 1973 Master's Plan, Ch. 16 in Grofman, ed., 
Political Gerrymandering at 302 (cited in note 12). 
17. Daniel Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, Ch. 4 
in Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering at 102 (cited in note 12). 
18. Cain, The Reapponionment Puzzle at 77, 188-91 (cited in note II). 
19. Elliott, 2 Const. Comm. at 207 (cited in note 13). 
20. Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner, Theo-
rist, and Reformer, Ch. 5 in Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering at 128-40 (cited in note 
12). 
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on the political process as a whole.' " The political process is too 
complicated to be settled with the kind of simple rules a court must 
use to be understandable. "Representation" and "fair representa-
tion" can mean too many different things. PR, the simple, straight 
road to proportionality, was also the simple, straight road to polit-
ical paralysis for the Weimar Republic, the Fourth French Repub-
lic, and Italy today. No one should want it. Nor should anyone 
want its not-so-straight, not-so-simple surrogates, which could be 
both dangerous and incomprehensible. The Court properly rejected 
proportionality as a standard, but offered no other standard in its 
place. "In effect, the court would be prescribing the partisan config-
uration of the legislature-the most political of tasks-and doing so 
on the basis of inevitably conflicting, inconclusive expert testimony 
about the uses and implications of such tests. This is surely a chil-
ling prospect.''2t 
What can one take away from this book? (1) A compendium 
of political-science techniques for identifying and dealing with ger-
rymanders. (2) Intriguing surveys of the extent of gerrymandering 
in various states. (3) Discussions of the California and Indiana ex-
periences. (4) Some gifted and occasionally dazzling exegesis of 
Bandemer, a case which, however, has been overtaken by events. 
And (5) the beginnings, but only the beginnings, of a debate over 
the proper scope of the reapportionment revolution. 
What is missing from the book? (1) Four-fifths of Peter 
Schuck's article. (2) Discussion of the extent to which the refusal to 
hear Badham v. Eu made Bandemer a dead letter. (3) Discussion of 
the secondary effects of partisan gerrymandering in states like Cali-
fornia. Has it lessened competitiveness? Cohesiveness? Workabil-
ity? Responsiveness? Has it polarized the legislature? Has it 
increased recourse to initiatives and referenda? (4) Discussion of 
the extent to which Madisonian checks and balances can curb the 
excesses of a gerrymandering faction, absent judicial intervention. 
The record, even in California, is not as bad as some think. (5) A 
serious rejoinder by the anti-interventionists to Gordon Baker's 
question about why courts are considered so well suited to control 
malapportionment, but so poorly to control gerrymanders. And (6) 
a serious rejoinder to Grofman's question about why courts are con-
sidered so well suited to control racial gerrymanders, but so poorly 
for partisan. 
Felix Frankfurter thought representation questions were a 
thicket and a quagmire, too standards-resistant and too "political" 
21. Peter H. Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial 
Solution, Ch. 11 in Grofman, ed., Political Gerrymandering at 241 (cited in note 12). 
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for a court to tackle. The majority in Baker v. Carr (1962) and 
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) thought not. Which was right? The Court 
has had many subsequent opportunities to intervene in representa-
tion questions, many of which are discussed in this book. It will 
doubtless have many more in years to come. This book tells us 
much about an important branch of the representation debate. But 
what does the branch tell us about the tree? 
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